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ABSTRACT
In Malaysia, private health insurance coverage is usually limited to inpatient treatment or hospitalisation. With private 
health insurance, there is a possibility that individuals will use health care services more frequently or spend more on 
health care (known as moral hazard effects) because they know they are protected. This study estimates the importance 
of factors affecting the demand for private health insurance and how it affects health care utilisation. This paper also 
provides an empirical test for the existence of moral hazard effects in health care utilisation. The analysis uses the 
second and third National Health and Morbidity Surveys (NHMS), which were conducted in 1996 and 2006. The analysis 
applies a bivariate probit model to estimate the demand for private insurance and its effect on the utilisation of health 
care. Utilisation of health care is defined as being admitted to either a public or private hospital. The results show 
that taking up private health insurance is lower among disadvantaged individuals, such as those with lower income, a 
lower level of education, those living in less developed regions and the unemployed. The findings also show that health 
conditions have a very strong effect on the hospitalisation decision. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that evidence 
of moral hazard existed in the 1996 but not in the 2006 data.  From the results, policy makers can target an appropriate 
population for providing health subsidies if the National Health Insurance Scheme is implemented.
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ABSTRAK
Di Malaysia, perlindungan insurans kesihatan swasta adalah terhad kepada rawatan pesakit dalaman atau kemasukan 
ke wad. Dengan insurans kesihatan swasta, terdapat kemungkinan seseorang individu akan menggunakan perkhidmatan 
kesihatan dengan lebih kerap atau memperuntukkan perbelanjaan yang lebih besar ke atas kesihatan (dikenali sebagai 
kesan bahaya moral) kerana mereka dilindungi. Kajian ini menganggarkan faktor-faktor penting mempengaruhi 
permintaan ke atas insurans kesihatan swasta dan bagaimana ia mempengaruhi penggunaan kesihatan. Kertas kerja 
ini juga mengkaji kewujudan kesan bahaya moral dalam penggunaan kesihatan. Analisis menggunakan data Kajian 
Kesihatan dan Morbiditi Kebangsaan 1996 dan 2006. Kaedah penganggaran menggunakan model bivariate probit. 
Penggunaan kesihatan didefinasikan sebagai kemasukan ke wad hospital awam atau swasta. Keputusan kajian 
menunjukkan permintaan ke atas insurans kesihatan swasta adalah rendah di kalangan golongan kurang berkemampuan 
seperti individu berpendapatan rendah, berpendidikan rendah, tinggal di kawasan kurang membangun dan juga golongan 
penganggur. Kajian juga menunjukkan status kesihatan mempunyai kesan kuat dalam mempengaruhi penggunaan 
kesihatan. Keputusan kajian turut membuktikan wujudnya bahaya moral dalam tahun 1996 tetapi tidak bagi tahun 
2006. Daripada keputusan kajian, pembuat dasar boleh mensasarkan golongan yang tepat dalam pemberian subsidi 
sekiranya Skim Insurans Kesihatan Kebangsaan diperkenalkan. 
Kata kunci: Insurans kesihatan swasta; pembiayaan kesihatan; bahaya moral; penggunaan kesihatan
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia’s health care service is shifting from a largely 
public-sector-provided system financed by general 
revenue sources toward relying on private sector services 
financed through fee-for-service models (National 
Household Health Expenditure Survey (NHHES) Final 
Report 1996). Although the government still heavily 
subsidises public health care at a nominal cost or for 
free, the health care system is shifting away from the 
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universal welfare model of public health care through 
several policy decisions. Such decisions are being made 
for several reasons: first, to generate more income from 
co-payments; second, to promote private health insurance 
and savings for health care through social security funds 
such as the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) (EPF is 
a social security institution that provides retirement 
benefits for private and non-pensionable public sector 
employees by managing their savings efficiently. There 
are two EPF accounts, namely, Account I and Account 
II. Withdrawals for medical expenses for EPF members 
and their families are allowed from Account II) or the 
Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) (SOCSO provides 
two social security schemes for private employees: the 
Employment Injury Insurance Scheme and the Invalidity 
Pension Scheme. These two social insurance schemes 
provide medical coverage and financial guarantees and 
protection to employees and their families in the event 
of accidents that result in outcomes such as disability 
or death or affliction with occupational diseases); third, 
to encourage non-government organisations, charitable 
bodies and firms to provide health service as a charitable 
act; fourth; to corporatise some hospitals; and finally to 
privatise some health services and foster the commercial 
private health care sector (Barraclough 1999). The most 
recent policy decision by the government is to introduce 
the 1Care for 1Malaysia concept that can create an 
efficient health care system through a national health 
care financing and delivery system (MOH 2011-2015).
The private health insurance sector in Malaysia 
is relatively new but is growing. In 1999, total 
expenditures by health insurance were 4.5% (Chee & 
Barraclough 2007). The percentage increased to 15% 
in 2006 (Central Bank of Malaysia 2005). Private 
health insurance coverage is usually limited to hospital 
inpatient treatment (either in a public or private 
hospital), and the patient is typically required to pay 
the hospital bill first and subsequently make a claim 
with the insurance company. To counter the effects of 
adverse selection, that is, when those with higher risks 
are more likely to take out insurance, all private health 
insurance is risk-rated. Higher risk individuals or patients 
with pre-existing conditions may be either precluded 
from insurance or face higher policy premiums. There 
are four common types of private health insurance: 
hospitalisation and surgical insurance, critical illness 
insurance, hospital income insurance and accidental and 
hospitalisation insurance (Pee 2008). Hospitalisation 
and surgical insurance is the most popular private health 
insurance in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, with private health insurance, the 
possibility exists that individuals have better information 
about their probability for illness than do insurance 
companies, which can lead to an adverse selection 
problem. Individuals may also spend more on health care 
because they know the cost of marginal expenditure is 
lowered by insurance. This can result in a moral hazard 
effect (Neudeck & Podczeck 1996; Feldstein 1973). 
For individuals, taking up private health insurance can 
significantly reduce out-of-pocket expenditures for health 
care treatment, especially in the private health sector, 
which charges higher fees. Normally, the co-payment is 
either 20% or 10% depending on the type of the private 
health insurance coverage purchased (Pee 2008).
Studies on market failure (either moral hazard 
or adverse selection) have been discussed in much of 
the previous literature (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976; 
Buchanan, Keeler, Rolph & Holmer 1991; Manning 
& Marquis 1996; Rosset & Huang 1973; Manning, 
Newhouse, Duan, Keeler & Leibowitz 1987; Propper 
1989, 1993; Newhouse 1993). Because all private health 
insurance is risk-rated and the insurance company can 
opt to terminate or not renew a health insurance policy, 
adverse selection may not be a strong feature of the 
private health insurance industry in Malaysia. The present 
study, however, might expect a moral hazard effect on 
utilisation associated with private health insurance and 
might observe selection behaviour by insurers. 
The present study estimates the importance of factors 
affecting the demand for private health insurance and 
how private insurance affects health care utilisation. The 
analysis uses the second and third National Health and 
Morbidity Surveys (NHMS), which were conducted in 
1996 and 2006. A seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
analysis is used to estimate the demand for private 
insurance and its effect on the utilisation of health care, 
which is defined as being admitted to either a private or 
public hospital. In Malaysia, private health insurance 
coverage is usually limited to inpatient treatment 
or hospitalisation. The results show that taking up 
private health insurance is lower among disadvantaged 
individuals, such as those with lower income, a lower 
level of education, those living in less developed regions 
and the unemployed. The findings also show that health 
conditions have a very strong effect on the hospitalisation 
decision. Furthermore, the results demonstrate evidence 
of moral hazard in the 1996 date, but the effect is reduced 
considerably in the 2006 data. This might be explained by 
the newly introduced private health insurance industry in 
the market in the mid-1990s, which might have triggered 
higher demand for medical care. 
In the existing literature, few empirical studies 
have examined the effect of health insurance on 
utilisation in Malaysia. For example, Wan Abdullah 
& Ng (2009a) examined the practices of two private 
hospitals, comparing their different charging practices 
for insured versus uninsured patients. Using data from 
insurance companies, they found no difference in private 
hospital expenditures for people who were insured 
versus uninsured. Wan Abdullah & Ng (2009b) also 
explored the effect of employer-based health insurance 
on the health services utilisation in Malaysia. They 
used private insurance company data and compared the 
frequencies of health claims made by employees and 
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their dependants from 10 companies that provided health 
insurance benefits to their employees. They found that 
the behaviour of the insured did not result in an increased 
rate of service utilisation. These studies do not support 
the finding of moral hazard in Malaysia. The present 
study provides further understanding of the impact of 
private health insurance, in particular its effect on the 
utilisation of health care using a nationwide survey data, 
that is, the NHMS.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized 
as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on the 
demand for private health insurance and its effect on the 
utilisation of health care. Section 3 describes the data and 
empirical models used in the estimation, and section 4 
discusses the results. Finally, section 5 concludes with 
some policy implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Most studies on the demand for health insurance and 
its effect on the utilisation of health care have been 
conducted in developed countries, which have an 
established health care system such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Australia. In the United States, 
the private health sector dominants and the public sector 
acts only as a safety net for the disadvantaged. In contrast, 
the United Kingdom health sector is highly subsidised 
by the government and dominated by the public sector, 
although the system has shifted to more of a public-
private mixed health care system (Bartlett & Phillips 
1996). Meanwhile, Australia has a mixed public-private 
health care system that provides a publicly financed health 
scheme, known as Medicare plus a significant private 
sector constituting about 47% of total health expenditures 
(Doorslaer, Clarke, Savage & Hall  2008).
Since the 1970s, researchers have been investigating 
the determinants of health demand and expenditures 
in order to suggest policies that might help lessen the 
burdens on low income groups. Earlier empirical work in 
the United States on the demand for health care showed 
that a greater local availability of hospital beds increased 
the quantity of health services demanded directly as well 
as through lower prices (Feldstein 1971). Later, Feldstein 
(1977) showed how higher quality or more expensive 
hospital care increases the demand for health care. From 
1958 to 1973, across all states in the United States, 
dramatic changes in the quality of care were said to be 
caused by increased demand stimulated by the growth 
of private and public insurance. Population density and 
other demographic factors have also been found to have 
influenced the demand for health care (Feldstein 1977). 
Furthermore, several studies have shown that price 
indeed affects demand for medical care. Price elasticity 
of demand in various types of settings can be substantial, 
for example, hospital stays ranging from −0.63 (Feldstein, 
1971) to −0.47 (Davis & Russell, 1972), physician care 
from −0.14 (Phelps & Newhouse, 1972) and overall 
elasticity of demand for medical care as large as −1.5 
(Rosett & Huang 1973). In China, Ying, Hu, Ren, Chen, 
Xu & Huang (2007) estimated the demand for health 
insurance for three types of insurance and found that the 
price elasticity of demand for major catastrophic disease 
insurance is −0.27, for inpatient expenses insurance −0.34 
and for outpatient expenses insurance −0.42. Because 
private health insurance is an important source of health 
financing in developed countries, many studies have 
discussed the demand for health insurance and the factors 
that affect it. In Australia, Cameron, Trivedi, Milne 
& Piggot (1988) found that income was an important 
factor in determining health insurance choice, whereas 
in England and Wales, Propper (1989) found that income 
and employment status increased the probability of health 
insurance purchase. 
In economic theory, people are predicted to spend 
more on health because they are insured and buy 
more insurance because of the high cost of health care 
(Feldstein, 1973). This behaviour may cause a moral 
hazard problem, which is one of two main types of market 
failure often associated with asymmetric information in 
providing insurance. Ex-ante moral hazard predicts that 
people with insurance may take greater risks than they 
would without it, because they know they are protected 
(retrieved from http://www.economist.com). Ex-post 
moral hazard concerns increased spending by an insured 
individual. Adverse selection is a second type of market 
failure that occurs when persons with poor health tend 
to choose insurance with high benefits and persons with 
good health tend to avoid such insurance because of its 
high cost (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976; Marquis & Phelps 
1987). Selection based on privately known risk aversion 
can be advantageous if those who are more risk averse 
buy more insurance coverage and have lower risks. In 
other words, the direction of insurance selection that 
results when individuals have private information about 
multiple dimensions of relevant information is unclear 
(de Meza & Webb 2001). 
In developed countries much evidence suggests 
that health insurance may cause both moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Early theoretical studies on moral 
hazard were conducted by Arrow (1963), Pauly (1968, 
1974) and Zeckhauser (1970). Arrow for example, 
considered moral hazard an imperfection, as does 
Zeckhauser. Pauly (1968) discussed the response of 
seeking more medical care as a consequence of rational 
economic behaviour. Since then, many researchers have 
estimated optimal health care insurance contracts and the 
types of market failure (i.e., moral hazard and adverse 
selection) such as Buchanan et al. (1991) and Manning 
& Marquis (1996). Furthermore, many early studies 
investigated the existence of market failure associated 
with private health insurance and factors that affect it, 
including Rosset & Huang (1973), Manning et al. (1987), 
Propper (1989; 1993) and Newhouse (1993).
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The effect of private health insurance on utilisation 
of medical care has also been studied in many developed 
countries. Significant effects of health insurance on the 
demand for health services (i.e., moral hazard) have been 
found in the literature from the United States (Newhouse 
1993; Manning & Marquis 1996). A study conducted 
by Wolfe & Goddeeris (1991) specifically observed 
pensioners who owned a Medicare supplementary policy 
called Medigap, and they provided some evidence of 
adverse selection and that the moral hazard effect is 
overstated if adverse selection is not considered. A study 
by Dave & Kaestner (2006) also found evidence of a 
direct (Dave and Kaestner (2006) defined direct moral 
hazard as the loss of health insurance resulted from the 
change in individuals’ health behaviour that reduced 
the risk or severity of illness) moral hazard effect in 
the Medicare insurance market, where private health 
insurance reduces prevention and increases unhealthy 
behaviours among elderly men. By looking at customers 
of similar health condition, Koc (2005) found that moral 
hazard effect for physician visits was higher for those in 
relatively better health. Other studies by de Meza (1983), 
Nyman (1999, 2003) and Nyman & Maude-Griffin (2001) 
found that consumer’s willingness to pay for treatment 
was altered by health insurance coverage. While 
findings in many empirical studies have shown a strong 
relationship between risk and insurance coverage, Fang, 
Keane & Silverman (2008) found that risk preferences do 
not appear to be a main source of advantageous selection; 
instead, the results suggest that cognitive ability plays an 
important role. 
In Australia, Cameron et al. (1988) suggested that 
for a broad range of health care services, both moral 
hazard and self-selection were important determinants 
of utilisation of health care services. Savage & Wright 
(2003) found that moral hazard could substantially 
increase the expected length of hospital stay when the 
endogeneity of the insurance decision was considered. 
Using the same set of data, Barret & Conlon (2003) 
compared singles’ and families’ health care utilisation. 
They found that from 1989 to 1995, insured persons 
were individuals with both bad health risks (indicating 
adverse selection behaviour) and good health risks. They 
also found, however, an increase in the degree of adverse 
selection within the privately insured population during 
this period.
In other countries, Sapelli & Vial (2003) showed 
adverse selection existed, specifically moral hazard 
in the Chilean health insurance industry among both 
independent and dependent workers. According to 
Sapelli & Vial (2003), a dependent worker is any person 
that works in a subordinate relationship with a contract. 
Independent workers are all active persons not included 
in the previous definition. In Germany, where 90% of 
the population is publicly insured, Riphahn, Wambach 
& Million (2003) confirmed the existence of adverse 
selection, with high-risk individuals being more likely 
to purchase supplemental add-on insurance. Another 
study in Germany by Hullegie & Klein (2010) analysed 
the effect of private health insurance on medical care 
utilisation. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel 
from 1995 to 2006, the authors found negative effects 
of private health insurance coverage on the number of 
doctor visits, no effects on the number of nights spent in 
a hospital, and positive effects on health. Geil, Million, 
Rotte & Zimmermann (1997), meanwhile, found no 
relationship between insurance coverage and the 
hospitalisation decision. In Belgium, Schokkaert, Van 
Ourti, De Graeve, Lecluyse & Van De Voorde (2009) 
used the bivariate probit model, finding weak evidence 
of adverse selection in the coverage of supplemental 
health insurance. 
While the standard economic treatment of moral 
hazard emphasises the negative aspect and finds large 
effects, Nyman (2004) suggested that much of moral 
hazard is actually efficient and benefits the consumer. 
He argued that moral hazard can generate welfare 
gains, for example, when people have a serious illness, 
are involved in serious procedures or need life-saving 
medical care where extra income from insurance can be 
used to purchase other important procedures. Although 
conventional theories have often suggested cost sharing 
policies to reduce moral hazard and increase welfare, 
Nyman (2004) suggested that the generated medical 
spending produces an overall welfare gain and that 
subsidising insurance premiums could be beneficial. High 
prices for health care are harmful, however, and above all, 
the new theory suggests that health insurance provides 
economy wide redistribution of income from the healthy 
to those who become ill. As a result, ‘efficiency’ is the 
new argument for national health insurance. 
Extensive discussion has ensued, therefore, regarding 
the demand for private health insurance and its effect on 
the utilisation of health care in developed countries with 
established health insurance markets. Nevertheless, 
many developing countries are still relying heavily on 
the government to finance health care. Although several 
ASEAN economies have recently extended coverage of 
their social health insurance schemes among the poor 
(Thailand and the Philippines), others are considering 
introducing some form of social or national health 
insurance (Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam) (Sidorenko 
& Butler 2007). Such considerations stem from new 
developments in health insurance markets, but limited 
empirical studies have been conducted in developing 
countries. Therefore, many of the studies in health care 
financing in developing countries have focused on the 
health systems themselves and health sector reforms 
(Wagstaff 2007; Hearst & Blas 2001) including Malaysia. 
In a developing country such as Malaysia, where 
private health insurance is a relatively new phenomenon 
and where there is a lack of data, limited empirical 
studies have been conducted on the relationship between 
health insurance and the utilisation of health care. Most 
163Moral Hazard and the Impact of Private Health Insurance on the Utilisation of Health Care in Malaysia
of the previous literature in Malaysia has emphasised 
issues such as the development of health care systems 
and affordability and equity issues (Yu, Whynes & Sach 
2008; Chee 2008; Saleh & Ibrahim 2005; Yon 2004). 
Generally, these studies are descriptive. In Malaysia, 
an empirical study on the determinants of the demand 
for medical care was conducted by Heller (1982). The 
results showed that total medical demand (the absolute 
volume of outpatient and inpatient consumption) was 
highly inelastic to the cash price and the cost at the time 
of utilisation. Total medical demand was also inelastic 
with respect to income.  
Until now, limited empirical evidence has emerged 
on the effect of health insurance on utilisation due to a 
lack of data, in part because private health insurance in 
Malaysia is still new and growing. Because studies by 
Wan Abdullah & Ng (2009a; 2009b) have not looked for 
the existence of moral hazard in Malaysia, the present 
study attempts to find empirical evidence of moral hazard 
effect from the use of private health insurance and how 
private health insurance influences health care utilisation 
in Malaysia.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This study used data from the second (1996) and 
third (2006) National Health and Morbidity Surveys 
(NHMSII and NHMSIII). From the NHMSII, this study drew 
information from Modules A, C, F, G, H, I, J and N. Data 
drawn from the NHMSIII questionnaire covers Module A 
(socio-demography) to Module V (women’s health). For 
the purpose of this research, information from Module 
A2, B, C, D, E, G, O, R and S was used because they 
are comparable with the NHMSII data. The NHMSII and 
NHMSIII are population-based surveys administered by 
trained interviewers. 
The NHMS lacks detailed health expenditure data, 
and indeed, no available single survey provides both 
health and expenditure data. In undertaking this research, 
therefore, other survey data in Malaysia are referenced, 
such as the Household Expenditure Survey (HES), in 
order to obtain the most representative variables for the 
analysis. The data from HES, however, cannot be used 
alone because it lacks data on health and diseases. The 
analysis was conducted based on available out-of-pocket 
expenditure data, which were extracted from Module D: 
Health Care Cost in the NHMSII questionnaire and Module 
B: Health Expenditure, Hospitalisation and Private Health 
Insurance from the NHMSIII. 
SAMPLE SELECTION
The present study’s analysis is confined to adults over 
the age of 21 years old, as it is plausible that parents 
make decisions for individuals below that age. The final 
samples were 29,690 observations from the NHMSII and 
29,654 observations from the NHMSIII. A seemingly 
unrelated bivariate probit estimation is applied. To adjust 
for differences in probability of selection, this study used 
a post-stratification weight, which considered population 
by state, region, ethnic and age group. 
The variables used in the present study are similar to 
those used in Schokkaert et al. (2009). We estimate the 
effect of private health insurance on health care utilisation 
with demographic, socioeconomic and numerous health 
status variables. In the present study, the dependent 
variables are admission to hospitals and health insurance. 
Admission to hospitals is defined as being admitted to 
either a government or private hospital as reported by the 
respondent in the past 12 months. Meanwhile, information 
on health insurance was generated from question S12 of 
Module A in the NHMSII, which asked, “Who pays for 
health care?” The health insurance variable was generated 
from the respondents who choose “insurance” at least 
once in the multiple answers of free, self, employer, 
insurance, donation or other type of payments. Variable 
health insurance was derived from question 8 in Module 
B3 of the NHMSIII survey. The question asked, “Do you 
have a private health insurance purchased by yourself?” 
with choices for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of health care payment 
methods in NHMSII and NHMSIII. In 1996, the NHMSII data 
show that the main source of financing came from out-
of-pocket payment, with 62.4% of the respondents using 
their own resources for payment. This is followed by 
employer-based health benefits (19.6%), a combination 
of self–employer-insurance (3.7%), free services (3.5%), 
a combination of self–employer (2.9%), a combination of 
free–self (1.7%), and a combination of free–employer–
self (0.4%). Payment by insurance alone was only 0.1%. 
In 2006, the NHMSIII data show that 20% of respondents 
have private health insurance. Among these respondents, 
8.5% have health insurance as part of a life insurance 
scheme, 4.6% own private health insurance, 6.7% have 
both types of insurance and 0.3% has other types of health 
insurance. In addition to data on out-of-pocket and private 
health insurance, the NHMSIII data have no information 
on other types of health care payment, such as employer, 
donation, free, and other types of payment. 
The independent variables such as socioeconomic 
indicators (such as household monthly income, 
education levels, job status and job sector), demographic 
characteristics (such as gender, age, marital status and 
ethnicity), geographical indicators (such as state grouping 
and region), and health conditions and lifestyles (such 
as hypertension, diabetes, asthma, and smoking status) 
were also used in the analysis. All variables are dummy 
variables. One limitation of using the NHMS data is that 
the NHMSII and NHMSIII ask a slightly different set of 
questions. For the purpose of estimation, the present study 
chose health and lifestyles variables that were available in 
both datasets, such as hypertension, diabetes, asthma and 
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smoking to ensure that the results were comparable. There 
may be some concerns about the endogeneity of some of 
the independent variables treated as exogenous in each of 
the two cross-sectional data sets. It would be ideal to have 
instruments for marital status, labour force status, income 
and smoking. As we have remarked previously, however, 
the data is quite restrictive, and because it is focussed 
on health rather than being a general survey, credible 
instruments do not exist. We also note that the majority 
of the literature that has faced the same data problems has 
treated these variables as exogenous. Table 2 includes the 
definition of all variables used in the analysis.
In the present study, the income variable was 
categorised into eight groups, with the lowest income 
group earning RM 0 to RM 400 to the highest group, 
with income higher than RM 5,000. The categories 
were developed following the income category in the 
NHMSIII dataset given by the Ministry of Health. The 
most prevalent household income group was the middle 
income group, which earns between RM 1,000 and RM 
2,000. This was chosen as the reference group. Data from 
the Third Outline Perspective Plan (2001–2010) show 
that the mean monthly household income in Malaysia 
increased significantly from RM 2,472 in 1999 to RM 
3,249 in 2004. Income in urban areas is much higher 
than income in rural areas. The average annual growth 
rate of income between 2000 and 2004 is 5% in urban 
and 1.8% in rural areas. Meanwhile, the incidence of 
poverty decreased from 8.5% in 1999 to 5.7% in 2004. 
According to Malaysia’s income poverty line, people 
are considered ‘poor’ if they have household monthly 
income less than RM 720 in Peninsular Malaysia, RM 960 
in Sabah and Labuan and RM 830 in Sarawak (retrieved 
from http://www.kpkt.gov.my/kpkt/main.php). Table 3 
TABLE 1. Distribution of Health Care Payment in NHMSII 
and NHMSIII
Types of payment Freq %
NHMSII
Self payment 18,534 62.43
Employer 5,826 19.62
Self-Employer-Insurance 1,109 3.74
Free 1,030 3.47
Self-Employer 870 2.93
Free-Self 498 1.68
Free-Employer-Insurance 107 0.36
Insurance 32 0.11
Other combinations 1,457 4.91
Missing, refused to answer or  
don’t know 227 0.77
No. of observations 29,690 100.00
NHMSIII
Health insurance 5,946 20.05
Type of private health insurance:
A.Part of life insurance scheme
B.Medical health insurance scheme
C. Others
A and B
A, B and C
A and C
B and C  
2,487
1,350
90
1,947
14
6
2
8.44
4.60
0.31
6.57
0.05
0.02
0.01
Missing 50 0.17
Not applicable 23,280 79.66
No. of observations 29,226 100.00
Source: Author’s estimation
TABLE 2. Definition of Variables from NHMSII and NHMSIII
Variables Definition
Dependent variables:
  PHI = 1 if respondent’s payment for health care is made by insurance 
  HOSP = 1 if respondent has been admitted to any hospitals during the past 12 months
Independent variables:
  Household income 
    HHINC0_399 = 1 if average monthly income is between RM0 – RM400
    HHINC400_699 = 1 if average monthly income is between RM400 – RM699
    HHINC700_999 = 1 if average monthly income is between RM700 – RM999
    HHINC1000_1999* = 1 if average monthly income is between RM1000 – RM1999 
    HHINC2000_2999 = 1 if average monthly income is between RM2000 – RM2999
    HHINC3000_3999 = 1 if average monthly income is between RM3000 – RM3999
    HHINC4000_4999 = 1 if average monthly income is between RM4000 – RM4999
    HHINC5000 = 1 if average monthly income is above  RM5000
  Education
    PRIMARY = 1 if completed primary education
    SECONDARY* = 1 if completed secondary education
    TERTIARY = 1 if completed tertiary education
    NO_EDUC = 1 if has no formal education
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  Job status
    GOVEMP* = 1 if works in government sector
    PVTEMP = 1 if works in private sector 
    SELFEMP = 1 if self-employed
    HOUSEWIFE = 1 if a housewife
    UNEMPLOYED = 1 if unemployed
  Job sector
    PROF_TECH = 1 if works as a professional or technical and related works
    CLERICAL = 1 if works in the clerical sector
    SERVICE_SALES* = 1 if works in the service or sales sector 
    PRODUCTION = 1 if works in the production sector 
    AGRICULTURE = 1 if works in the agriculture sector
    OTHER_JOBSECTOR = 1 if works in other sectors
  Age*sex
    AGEM21_35* = 1 if male and aged between 21 – 35 
    AGEM36_45 = 1 if male and aged between 36 – 45 
    AGEM46_55 = 1 if male and aged between 46 – 55  
    AGEM56_65 = 1 if male and aged between 56 – 65  
    AGEM66 = 1 if male and aged above 65  
    AGEF21_35 = 1 if female and aged between 21 – 35 
    AGEF36_45 = 1 if female and aged between 36 – 45 
    AGEF46_55 = 1 if female and aged between 46 – 55 
    AGEF56_65 = 1 if female and aged between 56 – 65  
    AGEF66 = 1 if female and aged above 65  
  Marital status
    MARRIED* = 1 if married
    SINGLE = 1 if single
  Ethnic
    MALAY* = 1 if Malay
    CHINESE = 1 if Chinese
    INDIAN = 1 if Indian
    OTHER_BUMIS = 1 if Bumiputera other than the Malays  such as the Indigenous people or tribal ethnic in Sabah and Sarawak
    OTHER_ETHNIC = 1 if belongs to other ethnic groups
  State grouping
    WEST_COAST* = 1 if live in Johor, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Penang, Kedah or Perlis in the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia
    EAST_COAST = 1 if live in Kelantan, Terengganu or Pahang in the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia
    EAST_MSIA = 1 if live in Sabah or Sarawak in the East Malaysia region
  Region
    URBAN* = 1 if living in urban area
    RURAL = 1 if living in rural area
  Health and lifestyles
    HPT = 1 if having hypertension
    DIABETES = 1 if having diabetes
    ASTHMA = 1 if having asthma
    SMOKE = 1 if currently smokes
  Admission to private hospital
    PVTCARE = 1 if respondent has been admitted to any private hospitals during the past 12 months
Note: Variable name with * is the reference group.
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shows the distribution of income and incidence of poverty 
in Malaysia.
Education in Malaysia is highly centralised and 
is administered by the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Higher Education. Children begin primary 
school at the age of seven for six years (standard 1–6), 
whereas secondary education extends for five years (form 
1–5). In the analysis, the levels of education available 
were no formal education, primary, secondary and 
tertiary education. Meanwhile, the variable job status 
refers to respondents who are working as government 
employees, private employees, self-employed, housewife 
or unemployed. Those who are employed are categorised 
into job sectors such as professional and technical, 
clerical, service and sales, agriculture, production and 
other job sectors. 
To determine whether age and gender influence 
the utilisation of health care, interaction variables were 
created for each age group and gender. It was expected 
that women in the reproductive period of 21 to 35 years 
old would have a significant effect on the utilisation of 
health care. The variable marital status was included to 
determine the same effect. Ethnicity was also predicted to 
influence the utilisation of health care. This variable was 
divided into five categories: Malay, Chinese, Indian, other 
Bumiputeras (e.g., tribal groups in Sarawak and Sabah 
such as Bajau, Kadazan, Melanau and Iban) and other 
ethnicities such as Europeans and other Asians. In 2000, 
the Population and Housing Census reported that of the 
total population of 22 million, Bumiputera (Bumiputera 
are Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups such as the 
Orang Asli (aborigines) in Peninsular Malaysia and the 
tribal peoples in Sabah and Sarawak) comprised 65.1%, 
Chinese 26.0% and Indians 7.7%, with the remaining 
consisting of a variety of ethnicities, among them the 
indigenous Orang Asli people (Department of Statistics 
2000). The Population and Housing Census 2000 is the 
fourth census implemented since Malaysia was formed. 
The previous censuses were conducted in the 1970, 1980 
and 1991. 
Health care is administered at the federal level; 
however, significant state differences in utilisation may 
indicate regional supply differences. Thus, states were 
grouped into three regions: West Coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia, East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia and East 
Malaysia. The West Coast region is more developed 
than the East Coast and East Malaysia. Variables of 
urban and rural were also included to determine any 
differences exist that are associated with living in or 
outside a city. 
To compare the results from NHMSII and NHMSIII, 
the reference group for each indicator was kept the same. 
The reference groups were individuals with household 
income between RM 1,000 and RM 2,000, a secondary 
education, government employees, service and sales 
sector, male aged between 21 to 35 years old, married, 
Malay, and live in the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia 
and urban areas. 
THE MODEL
To determine the extent of moral hazard effect of health 
insurance on health utilisation, the variable health 
insurance (PHI) was included in the hospital admission 
equations. A significantly positive coefficient means that 
people utilise more health care when they are insured. 
From the data, it is expected that health insurance will 
have a positive relationship with admission to hospitals.
Recognising the possible endogeneity of private 
health insurance status in explaining health care use, the 
present study used a recursive and seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit model. The bivariate probit model with 
endogenous dummy variables belongs to the general class 
of simultaneous equation models that Heckman (1978) 
introduced. It builds on a first reduced-form equation 
for the potentially endogenous dummy and a second 
structural-form equation to determine the outcome of 
interest (Fabbri, Monfardini & Radice, 2004). As Fabbri 
et al. (2004) described, the equation can be written as 
below:
 y1i
* = ′β1x1i +µ1i  [1]
 y2i
* = ′β2ix2i +µ2i =δ1y1i + ′δ2z2i +µ2i  [2]
where y1i
* = ′β1x1i +µ1i and y2i
* = ′β2ix2i +µ2i =δ1y1i + ′δ2z2i +µ2i are latent variables, y1i and y2i are 
dichotomous variables observed following the rule:
 { y1i =1 if y1i* > 0y2i =1 if y1i* > 0 ;l =1,2;  [3]
where x1i  and z2i  are vectors of exogenous variables, β1 
and δ2 are parameter vectors, δ1 is a scalar parameter, 
and ′β2 = (δ1 ′δ2 ′) . The error terms are assumed to be 
TABLE 3. Mean Monthly Gross Household Income and Incidence of Poverty by Region in Malaysia, 1999 and 2004
Strata In current prices (RM) Average annual growth 
rate (%) 2000 - 2004
Incidence of poverty (%)
1999 2004 1999 2004
Malaysia 2,472 3,249 5.6 8.5 5.7
Urban 3,103 3,956 5.0 3.3 2.5
Rural 1,718 1,875 1.8 14.8 11.9
Source: The Third Outline Perspective Plan 2001 – 2010, Malaysia (2001) 
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independently and identically distributed as bivariate 
normal, as shown in Equation 4:
 ( µ1iµ2i )~IIDN([ 00 ],[ 1 ρρ 1 ]) [4]
In the estimation, the exogenous vectors include 
private socioeconomic variables, demographic variables, 
geographical indicators, health and lifestyle variables, 
and private inpatient care utilisation. The model consists 
of two structural form equations for health insurance 
(y*iPHI) and health care utilisation (y
*
iHOSP) as presented in 
Equations 5 and 6:
 
yiPHI
* = ′αPHISOCIOi + ′βPHIDEMOi + ′γPHIGEOi +
′δPHIHEALTHi +εiPHI  [5]
 yiHOSP
* = ′αHOSPSOCIOi + ′βHOSPDEMOi +
′γHOSPGEOi + ′δHOSPHEALTHi +
′ϑ iHOSPPVTCARE + yiPHI + εiHOSP  [6]
where 
y*iPHI =  Private health insurance status;
y*iHOSP = Health care utilisation (admission to either 
government or private hospital); 
SOCIOi  =  Socioeconomic variables such as household 
monthly income, education level, job status 
and job sector;
DEMOi  =  Demographic variables such as age, gender, 
marital status andethnicity;
GEOi  =  Geographical indicator of state grouping and 
region variables;
HEALTHi  =  Health and lifestyle variables;
PVTCARE =  Private inpatient care variable.
In the absence of mandatory private health insurance, 
the demand for private health insurance is potentially 
driven by the rising cost of health care so that individuals 
who expect to use health services are more likely to 
demand private health insurance. The bivariate probit 
model allows for correlations between the unobserved 
determinants of private health insurance and health care 
utilisation. As discussed, this endogeneity is accounted 
for in the econometric specification. Dealing with other 
possible sources of endogeneity in addition to this issue 
is difficult because of the nature of the data and added 
econometric complications. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables 
used in the econometric analysis. The summary statistics 
are provided for all respondents and for individuals with 
private health insurance. This section discusses the means 
for individuals with private health insurance. In 1996, 
the weighted means for all respondents show that 5% 
of the respondents had private health insurance, which 
increased to 21% in 2006. The figures show that within 
10 years, it became more popular for Malaysians to pay 
for private health insurance. For individuals with private 
health insurance, 10% were hospitalised in 1996, which 
decreasing to 4% in 2006. Among these, 3% and 2% 
went to private hospitals in 1996 and 2006, respectively.
In 1996, the data show a strange picture in which 
22% of individuals with the lowest income (below RM 
400) owned private health insurance; in second place 
are individuals with income between RM 1,000 and RM 
1,999, whereas the highest income group (household 
income more than RM 5,000) has the lowest percentage of 
people opting for private health insurance (1%). Because 
the more affluent group usually comprises people who 
take up private health insurance, there is a possibility that 
some households underreported their income or over-
reported their insurance. Nevertheless, in 2006 the data 
show a significant decrease of individuals with private 
health insurance below the income of RM 400 from 22% 
TABLE 4. Sample Means, 1996 and 2006
Variable
1996 2006
All With PHI All With PHI
n=29,690 n=29,654
  PHI 0.05 - 0.21 -
  HOSP 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.04
  PVTCARE 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
  Household income 
    HHINC0_399 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.01
    HHINC400_699 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.03
    HHINC700_999 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.05
    HHINC1000_1999 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.22
    HHINC2000_2999 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.21
    HHINC3000_3999 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.15
    HHINC4000_4999 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.09
    HHINC5000 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.23
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  Education 
    PRIMARY 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.15
    SECONDARY 0.39 0.41 0.47 0.57
    TERTIARY 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.26
    NO_EDUC 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.01
  Job status
    GOVEMP 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.22
    PVTEMP 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.42
    SELFEMP 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.20
    HOUSEWIFE 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.11
    UNEMPLOYED 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02
  Job sector
    PROF_TECH 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.41
    CLERICAL 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.10
    SERVICE_SALES 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.19
    PRODUCTION 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.07
    AGRICULTURE 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.03
    OTHER_JOBSECTOR 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.07
  Age*sex 
    AGEM21_35 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.20
    AGEM36_45 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.17
    AGEM46_55 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13
    AGEM56_65 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
    AGEM66 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
    AGEF21_35 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19
    AGEF36_45 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
    AGEF46_55 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09
    AGEF56_65 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03
    AGEF66 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00
  Marital status
    MARRIED 0.64 0.66 0.78 0.80
    SINGLE 0.36 0.34 0.13 0.17
  Ethnic
    MALAY 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.40
    CHINESE 0.26 0.34 0.22 0.41
    INDIAN 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.12
    OTHER_BUMIS 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.05
    OTHER_ETHNIC 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02
  State
    WEST_COAST 0.56 0.92 0.66 0.75
    EAST_COAST 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.11
    EAST_MSIA 0.30 0.07 0.20 0.14
  Strata
    URBAN 0.55 0.57 0.64 0.80
    RURAL 0.45 0.43 0.36 0.20
  Health and lifestyle
    HPT 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.11
    DIABETES 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05
    ASTHMA 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
    SMOKE 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.34
Note: Descriptive statistics are calculated using cross-section sample weights.
Source: Author’s estimation
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in 1996 to only 1% in 2006. The data show that people 
with middle income buy more private health insurance 
than the higher income groups. 
The summary statistics show that taking up private 
health insurance is highest among individuals with 
secondary education, private sector employees, working 
in service and sales (in 1996), married, Malay and 
Chinese, and living in West Malaysia or urban areas. 
Among different age groups, both males and females in 
the age range from 21 to 46 are the most prevalent group 
with private health insurance. The means for the health 
conditions variables show that people with hypertension 
bought more private health insurance compared to people 
with diabetes and asthma. The small differences between 
the means for the entire population and those with private 
health insurance in 1996 suggests—as expected in a 
strongly risk-rated system—limited adverse selection. 
Furthermore, the lower rates for those with insurance 
in 2006 may suggest favourable selection on these 
conditions. Whereas more than 30% of smokers had 
private health insurance in both 1996 and 2006, little 
difference was observed between the entire population 
and those with insurance. This runs counter to the 
common finding of lower rates of smoking among the 
insured.
RESULTS
This section presents the results of a seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit model that jointly models the uptake of 
private health insurance and the probability of at least 
one night’s stay in a hospital. The findings for 1996 
and 2006, reported in Table 5, include the z-statistics 
and the marginal effects (ME), that is, the change in the 
absolute probability of having private health insurance or 
being admitted to hospital. The first four columns of the 
estimates are the results for 1996; the last four columns 
report results for 2006. The barely significant and 
insignificant coefficients on the insurance dummy in the 
hospitalisation equations show that when observables are 
taken into account adequately, limited evidence emerges 
of moral hazard in 1996 and none in 2006. Furthermore, 
as observed in the raw differences in prevalence of 
conditions across the insured and uninsured, there is 
no evidence of adverse selection. There is evidence, 
however, in 2006 that diabetics are significantly less 
likely to hold insurance, perhaps because insurers offer 
unfavourable contracts or even refuse coverage.
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) were used to select 
the best model. We tested three model specifications: 
without exclusions of the health condition variables in 
Equations 1 and 2; with exclusion in Equation 1 only; 
and with exclusions in Equations 1 and 2. Based on the 
lowest AIC and BIC, the present study chose the bivariate 
probit model without the exclusion. Table 6 shows the AIC 
and BIC results with (minus health and lifestyle variables) 
and without exclusion restrictions. Although Maddala 
(1983) argued that the parameters of the second equation 
are not identified if there were no exclusion restrictions 
on the exogenous regressors, Wilde (2000) proved that 
the classic identification problem actually does not exist. 
Problems will occur only if too small variations exist 
in the data. Given this evidence, the analysis used the 
bivariate probit model without any exclusion restrictions. 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEMAND FOR 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AND ITS  
IMPACT ON UTILISATION IN 1996
In 1996, the bivariate probit results show that the 
socioeconomic factors associated with higher private 
health insurances are income, education, job status, job 
sector, ethnicity, states and lifestyles. Compared to the 
omitted group, individuals with income between RM1,000 
and RM 1,999, individuals with a lower level of income 
(RM 400–RM 699, RM 700–RM 999 and middle income 
from RM 2,000–RM 3,000) are less likely to purchase 
private health insurance. Furthermore, compared to 
individuals with secondary education, individuals with 
tertiary education are also less likely to buy private 
health insurance. This is most likely the case because 
highly educated individuals have access to generous 
health subsidies from their employer. For example, in 
the government sector, government employees enjoy 
free treatment at government clinics and hospitals 
(Government of Malaysia, 1974). In the private sector, 
top management or executives are subsidised by their 
employer, especially when they visit panel clinics or panel 
hospitals. Individuals who have no formal education, the 
professionals, those working in the production sector, 
the Chinese and smokers are more likely to have private 
health insurance. Individuals with no formal education 
are more likely to have private health insurance, because 
they are most likely to be self-employed and not covered 
by either the government or private employers. As such, 
they need private health insurance more than individuals 
who have higher educational levels. As expected, the 
unemployed are also less likely to buy private health 
insurance, whereas professional, technical and production 
sector workers have a higher probability of purchasing 
private health insurance. 
In 1996, the results also show that demographic 
indicators such as ethnicity influence the probability 
of taking up private health insurance. The Chinese, 
for example, are more likely to have private health 
insurance, whereas individuals who live in less developed 
regions, such as the East Coast and East Malaysia, are 
less likely to buy private health insurance compared to 
individuals living on the West Coast. As expected, with 
the prevalence of risk rating, the present study found that 
health condition variables have no effects on people’s 
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TABLE 5.  Bivariate Probit and Marginal Effects for Private Health Insurance and Admission to Hospitals in Malaysia, 1996 and 2006
1996 2006
PHI HOSP PHI HOSP
ME z-stat ME z-stat ME z-stat ME z-stat
  HHINC0_399 0.0006 0.13 0.0059 0.82 -0.067 -6.35** 0.002 0.41
  HHINC400_699 -0.0139 -2.94** -0.0082 -0.91 -0.073 -9.94** 0.006 1.38
  HHINC700_999 -0.0196 -3.66** 0.0232 1.87* -0.030 -4.05** -0.002 -0.36
  HHINC2000_2999 -0.0168 -2.28** -0.0008 -0.05 0.047 7.29** 0.002 0.57
  HHINC3000_3999 -0.0149 -1.42 -0.0464 -1.69* 0.102 11.89** -0.003 -0.61
  HHINC4000_4999 -0.0078 -0.48 -0.0293 -0.88 0.112 9.66** -0.002 -0.31
  HHINC5000 0.0140 0.74 -0.0439 -2.17* 0.137 15.47** -0.010 -1.83*
  PRIMARY -0.0011 -0.25 -0.0108 -1.45 -0.065 -12.52** 0.000 0.05
  TERTIARY -0.0208 -3.83** -0.0091 -0.61 0.055 7.45** -0.008 -1.61
  NO_EDUC 0.0106 1.74* 0.0026 0.25 -0.096 -10.18** -0.008 -1.59
  PVTEMP -0.0091 -1.55 -0.0361 -3.95** -0.049 -8.03** -0.013 -3.15**
  SELFEMP 0.0084 1.33 -0.0446 -5.12** -0.040 -5.55** -0.012 -2.61**
  HOUSEWIFE -0.0043 -0.62 -0.0060 -0.51 -0.108 -14.10** 0.001 0.24
  UNEMPLOYED -0.0145 -1.98* 0.0150 1.16 -0.098 -10.32** 0.008 1.23
  PROF_TECH 0.0248 2.79** -0.0056 -0.46 0.087 11.25** 0.003 0.51
  CLERICAL 0.0050 0.32 0.0029 0.15 0.074 7.07** 0.006 0.87
  PRODUCTION 0.0122 2.04** 0.0088 0.85 0.007 0.79 -0.005 -0.77
  AGRICULTURE -0.0013 -0.21 0.0187 1.55 -0.033 -3.32** 0.005 0.88
  OTHER_JOBSECTOR 0.0071 0.92 -0.0043 -0.27 -0.018 -2.26** 0.001 0.21
  AGEM36_45 -0.0041 -0.67 0.0080 0.65 0.012 1.57 -0.006 -1.01
  AGEM46_55 -0.0037 -0.55 0.0286 1.93* -0.017 -2.04** 0.001 0.24
  AGEM56_65 0.0029 0.34 0.0356 2.28** -0.085 -10.03** 0.010 1.38
  AGEM66 0.0155 1.42 0.0522 2.62** -0.129 -12.23** 0.018 2.03**
  AGEF21_35 -0.0007 -0.09 0.1463 7.76** -0.044 -5.93** 0.034 5.37**
  AGEF36_45 0.0036 0.45 0.0545 3.80** -0.028 -3.36** 0.009 1.41
  AGEF46_55 -0.0053 -0.67 0.0069 0.50 -0.045 -5.03** 0.004 0.56
  AGEF56_65 0.0008 0.09 0.0020 0.14 -0.080 -7.58** -0.007 -0.95
  AGEF66 0.0019 0.17 0.0322 1.69 -0.125 -9.44** 0.019 2.11**
  SINGLE -0.0024 -0.49 -0.0114 -1.60 -0.022 -3.69** -0.005 -1.09
  CHINESE 0.0068 1.65* -0.0348 -4.16** 0.258 36.21** -0.019 -4.07**
  INDIAN -0.0080 -1.37 0.0418 3.94** 0.156 16.97** 0.011 2.27**
  OTHER_BUMIS 0.0152 1.10 0.0331 1.06 0.036 3.58** 0.017 3.00**
  OTHER_ETHNIC 0.0010 0.09 0.0127 0.69 -0.036 -3.13** -0.011 -1.88*
  EAST_COAST -0.0592 -6.68** 0.0283 2.60** 0.020 3.08** 0.013 3.45**
  EAST_MSIA -0.0531 -9.71** -0.0053 -0.37 -0.043 -6.74** -0.012 -2.99
  RURAL -0.0052 -1.50 0.0209 3.17** 0.003 0.61 -0.000 -0.00
  HPT -0.0008 -0.17 0.0430 5.27** -0.002 -0.28 0.030 7.70**
  DIABETES -0.0055 -0.82 0.0616 5.39** -0.020 -2.20** 0.041 8.03**
  ASTHMA -0.0045 -0.62 0.0727 6.07** -0.013 -1.21 0.046 7.72**
  SMOKE 0.0106 2.25** 0.0148 1.94* -0.007 -1.19 0.015 4.04**
PHI - - 0.1129 1.83* - -0.014 -1.05
PVTCARE - - 0.9496 32.43** - 0.965 128.40**
CONSTANT - -14.35** -14.16** -13.77** -20.57**
Sample size 21,292 29,654
χ2 (df) 14,379.64 (82) 61826.29 (82)
Rho (t) 0.1439(-1.83)
0.1023
(1.07)
Log likelihood -3099584.1 -5956409.0
Note: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
Source: Author’s estimation
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decision to buy private health insurance. Nevertheless, 
smoking is found to be positively significant for people 
to take up health insurance.
The marginal effects in the private health insurance 
equation are very small and do not show a significant 
impact of the variables on the probability of having 
private health insurance. Overall, the highest effect is seen 
for the geographic indicator, which shows a 10% decrease 
in living in the East Coast and East Malaysia decreases 
the propensity to take up private health insurance for 5.9 
and 5.3% respectively.
The second equation examined the factors affecting 
hospitalisation at government and private hospitals, 
conditional on private health insurance ownership. We 
found that individuals with income between RM 700 
and RM 999, a group less likely to have private health 
insurance, are more likely to be admitted to hospitals. 
While those in the higher income category (RM 3,000–RM 
4,000 and above RM 5,000) are less likely to be admitted. 
Compared to government employees, private employees 
and the self-employed are less likely to be admitted to 
hospitals. Notably, level of education and job sector have 
no significant effect on hospitalisation.
The demographic indicators show that age has strong 
effects on hospitalisation. Older males (older than 45 
years old) and females in the reproductive age (aged 21 
to 45 years old) are more likely to be hospitalised than 
other age groups. Compared to the Malays, the Chinese 
are less likely to be hospitalised, whereas the Indians are 
more likely to be hospitalised. Individuals living on the 
East Coast and in rural areas bring a positive effect on 
hospitalisation. Most importantly, all health condition 
and lifestyles variables show a positive relationship 
with hospitalisation. Choosing private care also shows a 
highly significant effect on hospitalisation. Finally, the 
1996 results show that individuals with private health 
insurance are 11.3% more likely to visit a hospital. This 
indicates that these individuals seek more care when they 
get sick, consistent with moral hazard behaviour. The 
effect is only significant, however, at the 10% level. The 
effect is insignificant in the 2006 data.
The highest marginal effects in the hospitalisation 
equation show that a 10% increase in being female aged 
21 to 35 years old increases hospitalisation by 14.6%. 
Private care increases hospitalisation by 11.3%, asthma 
by 7.3%, and diabetes by 6.2%. 
The rho estimate reported at the end of Table 5 
measures the correlation of the residuals from the two 
models. After accounting for the impacts of observable 
individual heterogeneity and other factors, a negative 
correlation (−1.83) is found between taking up private 
health insurance and hospitalisation in 1996. This 
indicates that unobserved characteristics of the sample 
(or random factors) that endow individuals with a higher 
a probability of having private health insurance also give 
them a lower probability of being admitted to hospitals. 
There are potentially important unobserved household 
characteristics such as family size or number of children 
that might positively affect the probability of purchasing 
private health insurance, but at the same time those 
unobservable also negatively affect hospitalisation. 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEMAND FOR 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AND ITS  
IMPACT ON UTILISATION IN 2006
In 2006, the NHMSIII data show that almost all variables 
have significant effects on the decision to purchase 
private health insurance. First, the results show strong 
socioeconomic differences. Purchasing private health 
insurance is associated with higher income when 
individuals with household monthly income of more 
than RM 1,000 to RM 1,999 (the reference group) are 
more likely to have private health insurance, whereas on 
the other hand, individuals with monthly income lower 
than the reference group are less likely to buy private 
health insurance. Education also plays an important 
role in determining the probability of having insurance. 
The results suggest that compared to individuals with 
secondary education, individuals with primary education 
or who received no formal education are less likely to 
TABLE 6. AIC and BIC Results
AIC BIC
1996 (n=21,292)
Full bivariate probit model 6202435 6203113
Bivariate probit model without health and lifestyles variables in equation 1 6205884 6206529
Bivariate probit model without health and lifestyles variables in equation 1 and 2 6257409 6258023
2006 (n=29,654)
Full bivariate probit model* 1.19e+07 1.19e+07
Bivariate probit model without health and lifestyles variables in equation 1 1.19e+07 1.19e+07
Bivariate probit model without health and lifestyles variables in equation 1 and 2 1.20e+07 1.20e+07
Source:Author’s estimation
 Based on the 1996 data, we selected the full bivariate probit model even though the AIC and BIC in 2006 for full bivariate probit model and 
bivariate probit model without health and lifestyles variables in equation 1 are the same
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have private health insurance. In contrast, maybe due 
to many interesting health insurance policies available 
in the market and with better information from higher 
education, individuals with tertiary education are more 
likely to purchase private health insurance in 2006. 
Notably, the sample means in Table 4 show that 42% 
of private employees have private health insurance. The 
bivariate probit results, however, show that individuals 
who work as private employees are less likely to have 
private health insurance than government employees. 
The self-employed, housewives and the unemployed 
are also less likely to purchase private health insurance 
compared to government employees. The introduction 
of CuepacsCARE for government employees and civil 
servants in 1999 increased the trend of taking up private 
health insurance among public sector employees. 
Furthermore, because government employees must 
pay out-of-pocket when they seek treatment at private 
hospitals, they are likely to purchase private health 
insurance to avoid the waiting lists and longer waiting 
times at government hospitals. On the other hand, 
most private employees do not purchase private health 
insurance, because they have access to treatment at 
private hospitals through their employment health 
benefits. Meanwhile, individuals who are working as 
professionals, technical or clerical workers are more 
likely to have private health insurance, whereas persons 
who are working in agriculture and other job sectors are 
less likely to have private health insurance. 
Older men above the age of 45 years and all women 
aged 21 years and above as well as individuals who 
are not married are less likely to have private health 
insurance. Compared to Malays, the Chinese, Indian and 
other Bumiputeras have a higher probability of securing 
private health insurance, whereas other ethnicity variables 
show otherwise. 
Despite living in the least developed states, 
individuals in the Eastern Region (Pahang, Terengganu 
and Kelantan) are more likely to purchase private health 
insurance compared to individuals who live on the West 
Coast. This might be the case because the distribution 
of government employees is higher on the East Coast 
(11.9%) than on the West Coast (9.3%) and in East 
Malaysia (11.8%). As noted, the present study found that 
government employees are more likely to have private 
health insurance. Because most insurance companies 
exclude individuals with pre-existing conditions from 
purchasing private health insurance, the present study 
found that similar to 1996 results, all health condition 
variables were not significant in determining the purchase 
of private health insurance except for those with diabetes. 
Because private health insurance plans do not cover pre-
existing illnesses or conditions, individuals with diabetes 
are less likely to purchase private health insurance. 
In 2006, the marginal effects for the private health 
insurance equation shows that taking up private health 
insurance correspond to changes in income. Indeed, a 
10% increase of income beyond RM 3,000 increases the 
probability of having private health insurance by more 
than 10%. Being a housewife, male or female aged above 
66 years and Chinese also increases the probability of 
purchasing private health insurance by more than 10%. 
Among all the dependent variables, being Chinese 
shows a very significant effect with a marginal effect 
of 25.8%. 
Results from the hospitalisation equation show that 
income does not significantly affect the probability of 
being admitted to hospitals except for individuals with 
income higher than RM 5,000. This income group is less 
likely to be admitted to hospitals. Education levels have 
no effect on hospitalisation. Nevertheless, the probability 
of being admitted to hospital is influenced by job status, 
whereby private employees and the self-employed are 
less likely to be admitted. In 2006, only males and females 
older than 66 and females in the reproductive years of 21 
to 35 are more likely to be admitted. Ethnicity variables 
show that the Chinese and other ethnicities are less likely 
to be admitted, whereas Indians and other Bumiputeras 
are more likely to be admitted to hospitals than Malays. 
States variables show that individuals who live on the 
East Coast are more likely to be admitted to hospitals, 
whereas people living in East Malaysia are less likely to 
be hospitalised compared to the West Coast. Similar to the 
results in 1996, heath condition and lifestyle variables as 
well as the private care variable show a strongly positive 
relationship with being admitted. 
Comparing the marginal effects between 1996 and 
2006 for the private health insurance and hospitalisation 
equations shows that the effects of having private health 
insurance are higher in 2006, whereas the marginal effects 
for hospitalisation are higher in the 1996 data. Finally, 
this study found that the private health insurance variable 
is not significant in influencing hospitalisation behaviour. 
This means that there is no moral hazard effect from 
the purchase of private health insurance. Overall the 
results show that these two equations are not correlated 
(rho=0.10), which is not statistically significant. 
CONCLUSION
The present research investigated factors that influence 
private health insurance ownership and admission 
to hospitals in Malaysia using National Health and 
Morbidity Survey data from 1996 and 2006. Within 10 
years, health insurance became more popular due to rising 
health care expenses in the private health sector. Given 
the possibility that individuals with health insurance 
will utilise more health care, as predicted by the moral 
hazard theory, the present study examined the size of 
the potential association between health insurance and 
admission to hospitals. The present study estimated a 
bivariate probit model in which the two behavioural 
equations were jointly estimated as a system with 
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correlated error terms to model an individual’s choice of 
health insurance and admission to hospitals. 
In the analysis, the effects of income, education level, 
job status, job sector, age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, 
states, region, and health conditions and lifestyles on 
the two behavioural models were tested. Using the 1996 
data, the results suggest that income, education, job 
status, job sector, ethnicity, states and smoking influence 
the decision to purchase private health insurance. In 
2006, however, almost all variables influence the health 
insurance decision (except region and health conditions 
such as hypertension, asthma and smoking).
From the analysis, several points are important to 
highlight. First, in 1996, the lower income groups were 
less likely to have private health insurance, but higher 
income was not significant in affecting the decision for 
private health insurance. In 2006, the lower income group 
was still less likely to have private health insurance, 
but the higher income groups were now more likely to 
have private health insurance. This might be explained 
by the country’s steady economic growth and higher 
individual income in 2006. Rising income also increases 
expectations and demands for better health care, which 
leads to an increase in the costs of treatment (Economic 
Planning Unit, 1996). This, in turn, increases the demand 
for private health insurance. Moreover, the increasing 
popularity of private health insurance to cover increasing 
health care costs is an important factor that influences the 
private health insurance decision. Second, individuals 
with a higher educational level were more likely to have 
private health insurance in 2006 compared to 1996. 
Increasing awareness among the population about the 
importance of having health insurance to cover health 
care costs might be one of the reasons for this finding. 
Third, among different ethnic groups, only the Chinese 
were found to be more likely to have private health 
insurance in 1996. In 2006, however, the Chinese, Indians 
and other Bumiputeras are significant in influencing the 
decision for private health insurance. This findings show 
that private health insurance has become more popular 
and larger in terms of coverage and also more affordable 
among ethnicities other than the Chinese. 
The present study also found that the health 
insurance variable is not significant in the admission 
model, which suggests no evidence exists of moral hazard 
behaviour in the 2006 data. In Malaysia, private health 
insurance is used commonly for hospitalisation and 
surgical treatment at both the government and private 
hospitals. Because the government and private hospitals 
are usually located in urban areas, the use of private 
health insurance is limited to individuals who live in 
these areas. As a result, the findings demonstrate that 
individuals with lower income, a lower level of education, 
living in rural areas or in less developed regions, being 
a housewife, a student or unemployed are less likely to 
have private health insurance or have someone else pay 
for their health care. Being in these disadvantaged groups 
might affect an individual decision to go to hospital or to 
get treatment. Moreover, the 1996 and 2006 data show 
that people with health insurance tend to visit private 
hospitals. Since the government is planning to introduce 
a national health insurance scheme, this study supports 
the findings of Alvin (1996) which recommended that in 
addition to the existing methods of financing, Malaysia 
should introduce social insurance that subsidises the poor 
and provides little or no subsidy to the upper and middle 
income groups. If the government plans to introduce a 
new health financing scheme in the future, any policy 
reforms should consider its consequences on the less 
advantaged group especially the poor. 
In the future, with the availability of comprehensive 
health insurance data, research on asymmetric information 
such as adverse selection effects should be conducted. It is 
hoped that the present study’s findings will assist policy 
makers fill the knowledge gap created by the limited 
number of empirical studies on the importance of health 
care financing alternatives in Malaysia.  
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